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ABSTRACT 
 
A three-pronged approach was adopted to the 
investigation of causes of maintenance errors in army 
aviation. In the first phase of the research, analysis of 
maintenance incident reports suggested that individuals 
were mostly at fault, making errors because they failed 
to follow procedures and were inadequately supervised. 
Interviews with maintenance technicians, on the other 
hand, put the spotlight on organisational variables, such 
as pressures created by poor planning. In the third 
phase, a survey instrument administered to 448 
maintenance workers  was used to develop a structural 
model that predicted 34% of the variance in 
psychological health, 16% of the variance in turnover 
intentions, and 16% of the variance in self-reported 
maintenance errors. Implications of these findings are 
discussed. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
An examination of the human factors literature by 
Hollnagel (1993) pinpoints the fact that human error is 
increasingly implicated in accidents relating to complex 
technological systems. In the aviation industry, 
whenever the probable causes of aircraft accident are 
listed, maintenance-associated deficiencies invariably 
hold a prominent place. Graeber and Marx (1994, p.88) 
define maintenance error as “… an unexpected aircraft 
discrepancy (physical degradation or failure) attributed 
to the actions of the aircraft maintenance technician”. 
Rankin (1997), in examining the experience of the 
Boeing organisation, reports that improper maintenance 
contributes to 15 per cent of commercial jet accidents.  
Based on Boeing’s experience, Marx (1998) calculated 
that in the USA alone the number of commercial aircraft 
dispatched each year with a maintenance error is 
roughly 48,800.   
 
Hollnagel puts forward a number of reasons for this 
emphasis on human fallibility of which at least three 
have implications for the aviation industry.  In the first 
place the reliability of mechanical and electronic 
components has increased markedly in the past 30 years 
while the level of human reliability has remained 
virtually unaltered over the same period.  Secondly, the 
increase in system complexity and automation has 
placed greater demands on those responsible for their 
maintenance.  Finally, the growth in system complexity 
provides the environment envisaged by Reason (1990) 
in which latent failures resulting from increasingly 
intricate procedures blend with operator errors and 
violations to place the organisation at risk. It follows 
that failures in technological systems cannot be 
attributed solely to technical aspects; they also embrace 
behavioural factors deriving from individuals and 
organisations operating and maintaining those systems.  
 
The present study was designed to explore the role 
of individual and organizational variables in 
maintenance performance in the aviation industry. 
Specifically, the objectives of the study were to: a) 
examine a number of organisational, job and individual 
factors that were considered likely to impact on 
maintenance performance; b) explore the relations 
among these variables; and c) develop a model for 
predicting important work outcome variables such as 
turnover intentions, psychological health, and self-
reported maintenance errors. 
 
Three data collection methods were used in the 
study:  
• analysis of recent maintenance incidence reports;  
• interviews with personnel at all levels of the 
maintenance operation;  
• completion of the Maintenance Environment 
Survey Scale (MESS), an instrument developed for 
the purpose of this study.  
 
The findings from each of these three methods will 
be presented separately. 
 
PHASE 1: CLASSIFICATION OF ERRORS  
 
As varied error types each require their own 
preventative strategies it has become common practice 
to categorise errors so that the reasons which lead to 
their occurrence might be identified.  Examples are to 
be found in the work of Miller and Swain (1987) who 
classify errors under omission, commission, substitution 
or mis-timed actions, and in Reason (1990) where errors 
take the form either of slips, lapses or mistakes.  
Rasmussen (1983) provides a more complex 
description, classifying errors according to the level of 
cognitive control being exercised by the operator when 
the error occurred. The ICAO (1992) has formally 
recommended the SHEL model as a most useful tool in 
analysing human factors.  Advocated by Edwards 
(1988), the acronym represents Software (procedures, 
documentation), Hardware (tools, equipment), 
Environment and Liveware (people) and divides a 
person’s interactions into each of these four broad areas.  
 
Two types of record relating to maintenance 
incidents in Army Aviation were available:  
 
• Maintenance Incident Reports (MIRs). MIRs are 
required when an aircraft incident occurs during a 
period of operation, and arises from deficiencies in 
maintenance policy, procedures, practices, and/or 
equipment. MIRs are also required when an aircraft 
is damaged as a result of an event occurring outside 
the period of operation, or a piece of equipment 
used in maintenance operations is damaged, or 
personnel are injured, or a serious error occurs in a 
particular maintenance procedure or activity. 
• Maintenance Occurrence Reports and Evaluations 
(MOREs). These are similar to MIRs but cover 
problems detected before the aircraft is returned for 
operational duties. MOREs are often triggered by 
post maintenance test flights. Thus, the main 
distinction between MIRs and MOREs is the point 
at which the error is detected. 
 
Both types of record were stored at a central 
location to which researchers had access. Both 
MIRs and MOREs require the investigating team to 
classify the cause of error using a system based on 
the SHEL model. Analysis of these reports thus 
promised to shed light on management's view on 
the major causes of maintenance errors. Table 1 
summarises the causes of 250 incidents reported 
between Jan 1996 and Aug 1998. 
 
Table 1. 
SHEL Classification of Maintenance Errors from Jan 
1996 to Aug 1998 
 
Official Cause of Error Frequency
1. Inadequate supervision 101
2. Incorrect procedures followed 80
3. Inadequate experience/ training 38
4. Manuals not used correctly or 
manuals omit steps.  
15
5. Non-compliance with rules and 
policies 
7
6. Material deficiencies (e.g., 
incorrect marking of parts) 
6
7. Stress or fatigue 2
8. Communication failure 1
  Σ = 250
 
It can be seen from these tables that the most common 
form of error involved the maintenance people actually 
making an error and the error not being detected by the 
supervisor. The emphasis is very much on failures of the 
individual. Note that stress and fatigue - commonly 
thought to be the cause of many errors - were rarely 
reported as causes. 
 
PHASE 2: WORK CONDITIONS 
 
The second phase of the investigation involved 
structured interviews with 166 maintenance personnel 
organized into 18 focus groups. Groups typically met 
for up to an hour with two of the investigators for an 
open-ended discussion of factors affecting performance. 
The aim of this phase was to identify common themes 
relating to problems experienced in maintenance work 
and to weigh these against the official views 
summarised in the MIRs and MOREs. The findings are 
summarised below. 
 
Table 2 
Common Themes Emerging in Focus Groups 
 
Theme Frequency Reported 
(max = 18) 
Availability of parts 14 
Workload flow  13 
Physical conditions * 13 
Training deficiencies  11 
Scheduling problems 10 
Non-maintenance duties ~ 10 
Poor planning 10 
Notes: 
* Whilst on deployment 
~ For example, military duties 
 
To conserve space, issues that were raised in fewer 
than 10 of the 18 groups do not appear in Table 2. These 
data, stripped of their richness in this summary table, 
painted a somewhat different picture of the organization 
in which the MIRs and MOREs were generated. Here 
the emphasis was mainly on factors that can make 
maintenance work difficult and it can be seen that most 
of the issues relate to organisational planning. Personal 
issues such as fatigue and stress were not often 
mentioned. 
 
PHASE 3: DEVELOPING A MODEL  
 
As mentioned earlier, this study also investigated the 
extent to which a number of organisational, job and 
individual variables influence maintenance errors and 
other intermediate outcome variables, such as health and 
turnover. The variables comprising the “Dirty Dozen” 
(e.g., Taylor, 1997) were used as a starting point for an 
examination of the organisational and job elements that 
might impact on performance.  Input variables for other 
outcomes indirectly related to performance have already 
been identified in the literature – for example safety 
(e.g., Shappell and Wiegmann, 1997) and job 
satisfaction (e.g., Bogg and Cooper, 1995). In addition, 
a decision was made to include a number of relevant 
individual aspects, especially the extent to which 
individual dispositions arising from personality 
characteristics influence performance.  
 
Maintenance Environment Survey Scale (MESS) 
 
A questionnaire was developed to measure a range 
of variables considered to be related to maintenance 
performance. The variables comprising the 
questionnaire, which we called the Maintenance 
Environment Survey Scale (MESS), are described 
below. 
 
• Rewards, Recognition. This variable assesses the 
extent to which people feel that they are rewarded and 
recognised for doing good work. Example: Q33. In this 
job, people are rewarded according to performance. 
• Physical Conditions. Measures the quality of the 
actual physical surrounds of the workplace. Example: 
Q40. The physical conditions make working here 
unpleasant. 
• Attitude To Safety. Assesses the perception that the 
organisation has a strong concern for safety issues. 
Example: Q45. This unit regards safety as a major 
factor in achieving its goals. 
• Efficiency. There are many aspects to efficiency; 
here we looked at the tendency of the work units to 
emphasise improvement in work practices. Example: 
Q50. In my unit, management actively supports our 
efforts to improve. 
• Training. The items in this scale covered a number 
of different aspects of training, including adequacy of 
training for the job, encouragement to undertake further 
training, and opportunities for on-the-job training. 
Example: Q94. My training and experience has 
prepared me well for the duties of my current job. 
• Documentation/Procedures. Poor documentation is 
often cited as a reason for maintenance errors. Example: 
Q110. Maintenance procedures are accurately 
described in our technical manuals. 
• Family Pressures. Maintenance personnel in the 
armed forces are often required to be absent from home. 
It was expected that the absences would result in 
personal strain, which may in turn affect work 
performance. Example: Q115. The demands of my work 
interfere with my home and family life. 
• Stress. There is no doubting the effect that stress 
can have on work performance. The questions 
comprising this scale tended to tap actual feelings and 
consequences of stress, rather than background factors 
that might be causing the stress. Example: Q132. 
Workload pressures have at times affected the quality of 
my work. 
• Fatigue/Sleep. Given the difficulty of adequately 
assessing fatigue in a self-report measure, the questions 
in this scale focussed on the quality of sleep. Example: 
Q140. My overall sleep quality is extremely poor. 
• Positive and Negative Affectivity. Much has been 
written about the work impact of background 
personality dispositions, such as the tendency to see 
things in a negative light (e.g., Fogarty et al, 1999). 
Items from Watson, Clark, and Tellegen's (1988) 
Positive and Negative Affectivity Schedule (PANAS) 
were used to measure both positive and negative 
affectivity. 
• General Health. The General Health Questionnaire 
(GHQ: Goldberg and Williams, 1988), an instrument 
already widely used in the armed services, was included 
as part of the survey of maintenance personnel. The 
GHQ explores four aspects of psychological health: 
somatic symptoms (e.g., Have you been getting any 
pains in your head?); anxiety and insomnia (e.g., Have 
you found everything getting on top of you?); social 
dysfunction (e.g., Have you felt that you are playing a 
useful part of things?); and severe depression (e.g., 
Have you felt that life isn't worth living?). An 
abbreviated, 12-item version of the GHQ was used here. 
• Job Satisfaction. The questions in MESS targetted 
the actual feeling of satisfaction, rather than why they 
might or might not feel this way. Example: Q13. I like 
maintenance work. 
• Responsibility. When employees enjoy a sense of 
responsibility for their work, it is reasonable to expect 
that they will exercise more care and diligence. 
Example: Q29. I feel I have little input into the decision-
making at work. (Reverse-scored item). 
• Supervision. The quality of work supervision was 
brought forward as a problem in a number of our 
interviews with management in the early stages of this 
project. Example: Q69. My immediate supervisor really 
understands the maintenance task. 
• Support from Coworkers. It is difficult to operate 
effectively in a work environment unless there is a 
feeling of support from one's colleagues. In the present 
instance, questions focussed on expectations that - if 
needed - workers would receive assistance from 
coworkers. Example: Q83. Most of my workmates can 
be relied upon to do what they say they will do.  
• Feedback. Many maintenance personnel are in the 
early stages of their careers and still learning the trade. 
Their effectiveness is likely to be shaped by the amount 
and quality of feedback they receive. Example: Q85. 
The quality of our work is rated or evaluated frequently. 
• Organisational Commitment. Again, interviews 
with management highlighted concerns with the level of 
organisational commitment in today's maintenance 
workforce. Such concerns were fuelled by the 
outsourcing of maintenance tasks, the mixing of 
civilians and service personnel in the same workplace, 
and a possible shift in values among service personnel. 
Example: Q106. I am proud to tell others that I am part 
of this unit. 
• Turnover Intentions. Q11 asked about the job 
intentions of staff, whether they intended to keep 
working in the maintenance industry, leave the industry, 
or whether they were uncertain. High turnover leads to 
manpower shortages and greater pressure on existing 
staff to keep up with the workload. 
• Errors. MESS included four questions that asked 
the respondents to indicate whether they made 
maintenance errors on the job (Q131 to Q134). These 
included errors that they detected themselves and those 
picked up by their supervisors. 
All items employed a five-point (1-5) Likert scale 
format where 1 indicated strong agreement and 5 strong 
disagreement. The Maintenance Environment Survey 
Scale (MESS) was delivered to all maintenance 
personnel, including officers in charge of maintenance 
units.  
 
Results of Survey 
 
Some salient features of the overall sample are 
worth mentioning: 
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
448 individuals responded to the survey, 95% of 
whom were male; 
84% of respondents were Army personnel, 15% 
civilian contractors, and 1% airforce or navy; 
11% were trainees, 41% tradespersons, 22% 
supervisors, 11% independent inspectors, 15% other; 
average time in maintenance was approximately 10 
years; 
61% of respondents indicated that they intended to 
continue working in maintenance, a further 23% were 
uncertain; 
• 79% of respondents admitted to making errors that 
they picked up themselves, 50% to making errors that 
were detected by supervisors. 
 
To establish whether the questionnaire succeeded in 
measuring the aspects it set out to measure, the items 
were subjected to factor analysis. As a result of these 
analyses, some items were discarded. The remaining 
items were used to form scales that in general 
conformed to those intended to be captured by MESS. 
All scales had satisfactory reliability estimates (α > 
.70). Structural equation modelling (SEM), using 
Arbuckle's (1997) AMOS program, was then employed 
to test models of the relations among the MESS 
variables. A two-step approach was followed wherein a 
second order measurement model was derived from the 
composite variables followed by testing of a structural 
model linking the input and output variables. Without 
going into details of various competing models that 
were tested, the model shown in Figure 1 reflects the 
rationale for selection of variables for this study and 
provides a good fit to the observed data (χ2, 74  = 
152.07 .14, p < .01; AGFI = .93; TLI = .93; RMSEA = 
.04).  
 
 
Figure 1 
Structural Model Showing Relations Among Input and Output Variables 
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The salient points of the model are as follows: 
• Rewards, Safety, Supervision, Coworker Support, 
Feedback, Training, and Documentation are indicators 
of an underlying construct labelled Workplace.  
• Sleep Quality, Stress, and General Psychological 
Health are indicators of an underlying construct called 
Health. 
• Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment 
are indicators of a construct called Morale.  
• Errors and Job Intentions are entered as separate 
outcome variables. 
• Workplace predicts 54% of Morale and 34% of the 
variance in Health. Both of these are important work 
outcomes. 
• Workplace variables do not have a direct effect on 
Errors or Job Intentions but they do have an indirect 
effect through Morale and Health. 
• Morale and Health, between them, predict 16% of 
self-reported errors and 16% of turnover intentions. 
• A number of variables did not appear in the final 
model for reasons which cannot be discussed here.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
MESS provided two sorts of data: descriptive data 
(not reported here) and data pertaining to relations 
among variables thought to be important in 
maintenance. Both sorts of data have proved valuable in 
our quest to uncover sources of maintenance errors. The 
descriptive data, collected from 448 respondents, paints 
a picture of overall satisfaction with many aspects of the 
workplace. There was surprising support for the level of 
training and the quality of supervision, two areas that 
were often criticised during the interviews. Thus, the 
survey proved a useful counterbalance to some 
impressions acquired through the interviews. 
 
At the survey level, the present version of MESS 
captured some of the major factors relating to to work 
performance. The model shown in Figure 1 helps to 
explain what are apparently conflicting findings from 
the incident reports and the interview data.  As 
mentioned earlier, the incident reports tend to put the 
spotlight on human error as the cause of incidents.  This 
is not a surprising outcome, Shappell and Wiegmann 
(1997) noted that such reporting systems generally 
focus on identifying "human failures without regard for 
why the failures occurred" (p.270).  Figure 1 shows that 
it is indeed the individual factors that affect errors and 
turnover intentions.  The direct links between 
Workplace and these two output variables were not 
significant and therefore not shown in the diagram.  
However, Figure 1 also shows that the individual factors 
are strongly driven by workplace concerns.  Thus, the 
casual path is as follows: organisational factors Æ 
individual factors Æ errors.  The SEM approach has 
helped to demonstrate the nature of this link.  
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